Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood wikipedia
Excerpt:
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
In 1970, Mahmood came back to Pakistan where he joined PAEC. Before joining Pakistan's nuclear program, Mahmood was trained at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology or PINSTECH. He was a distinguished member of Nuclear Physics Group at PINSTECH, where he along with Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, Muhammad Hafeez Qureshi and Dr. Naeem Ahmad Khan, studied and researched in the field of Nuclear Technology. During his master studies, Mehmood had read scientific reports of the "Manhattan Project" while receiving his training at the Birmingham University, where he also had an opportunity to discuss enrichment technology with scientists from South Africa, who were then exploring the jet nozzle process of enrichment.[1]
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/spy-talk/2011/02/cias_top_libyan_contact_musa_k.html
Excerpt:
Posted at 10:00 PM ET, 02/23/2011
CIA's top Libyan contact Musa Kusa may go down with GaddafiBy Jeff Stein
The Libyan official who was a key CIA contact in the war on terrorism and the removal of Moammar Gaddafi’s weapons of mass destruction may have no option now but to go down with the ship.
Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, who plotted assassinations and airline bombings as well as helped Washington pursue al-Qaeda terrorists, cannot defect to the opposition like other top Libyan officials, says a spokesman for a U.S.-based Libyan human rights group, because “he has too much blood on his hands.”
“He will not be part of any democratic government in the future, that’s a sure thing,” said Omar Khattaly, spokesman for the Libyan Working Group, which has offices in Atlanta, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Interactions between State Department officials and the Libyan government continue. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns spoke twice over the last two days with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman has spoken with Kusa several times, the State Department said.
Spokesman P.J. Crowley said on Thursday that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to call Kusa earlier this week, but that the call could not be completed due to technical reasons. No attempts have been made to talk with Qaddafi directly, he said, but the State Department has passed him messages through unidentified third parties.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mussa_Kussa
Excerpt:
Mussa Kussa (born c. 1949) is a Libyan political figure and diplomat who has served in the government of Libya as Minister of Foreign Affairs since March 2009. He previously headed the Libyan intelligence agency from 1994 to 2009 and is considered one of the country's most powerful figures.[1]
[edit] Education
Kussa attended Michigan State University, earning a bachelor's in sociology in 1978.[2]
[edit] Diplomat and intelligence chief
Kussa worked as a security specialist for Libyan embassies in Europe before being appointed as Libya's Ambassador to the United Kingdom in 1980. He was expelled from the United Kingdom later in 1980, after stating his intention to eliminate political opponents of the Libyan government who were living in the UK. Later he served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1992 to 1994 and as the head of the Libyan intelligence agency from 1994 to 2009.[1]
[edit] Foreign minister
On 4 March 2009, Mussa Kussa was designated as Minister of Foreign Affairs, replacing Abdel Rahman Shalgham, in a ministerial reshuffle announced by the Libyan parliament.[1]
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=musa_kusa_1
Excerpt:
Profile: Musa KusaMusa Kusa was a participant or observer in the following events:
Shortly Before September 11, 2001: CIA Learns Pakistani Charity Front Tried to Sell Nuclear Weapon to Libya, but Takes No Effective Action Against It
According to a 2007 book by former CIA Director George Tenet, shortly before 9/11, the CIA learns that a Pakistani charity front has been helping al-Qaeda acquire weapons of mass destruction. The charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), was founded in 2000 by two prominent nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed (see 2000). UTN allegedly is conducting charitable projects in Afghanistan, but a friendly intelligence service tells the CIA that UTN is really helping al-Qaeda build weapons, especially nuclear weapons. Tenet will claim that he presses “all of our contacts worldwide to find out anything we could about the people and organizations with WMD that might be wiling to share expertise with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.” Ben Bonk, deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), meets with Musa Kusa, head of Libya’s intelligence service, and Kusa tells him that Libya had contact with UTN. “Yes, they tried to sell us a nuclear weapon. Of course, we turned them down.” According to Tenet, this confirms other information from a different intelligence agency that UTN approached Libya with an offer to provide WMD expertise. The CIA then informs the Pakistani government of this, and Pakistan brings in seven board members of UTN for questioning. But according to Tenet, “The investigation was ill-fated from the get-go” and the UTN officials “were not properly isolated and questioned.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 262-263] Also shortly before 9/11, the CIA also learns that the two nuclear scientists who founded UTN had recently met with Osama bin Laden and advised him on how to make a nuclear weapon (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). But despite all this the US takes no other action against UTN before 9/11, not even freezing the assets of the charity until December 2001 (see Early October-December 2001).
Entity Tags: Musa Kusa, Ben Bonk, Central Intelligence Agency, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, George J. Tenet, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ummah_Tameer-e-Nau
Ummah Tameer-e-Nau wikipedia
Excerpt:
Ummah Tameer-e-Nau or UTN is a militant organization banned by United States Department of the Treasury on December 20, 2001.[1][2] It was also placed on Patriot Act Terrorist Exclusion List[3]. It is suspected of supplying information about constructing Nuclear weapons to Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.[4]
[edit] Origin
UTN was founded in June 2000 by Pakistani Nuclear scientist Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood who resigned from Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission in 1999 in protest of the government's willingness to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.[5] He had previously served as Director for Nuclear Power and was the chief designer and director of Pakistan's Khushab Reactor.[6] Mahmood was a supporter of the Taliban and once described the Taliban as the "ideal Islamic state".[1] He was awarded Pakistan's third highest honour Sitara-i-Imtiaz in March 1999 by the President of Pakistan.[5]
[edit] Membership
Lieutenant-General (retired) Hamid Gul former chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence was also a member and has acknowledged this.[7] Other prominent Pakistani scientists, retired military officers, and industrialists were also members of UTN:
Dr. Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, a former high ranking official at Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, atomic physicist and an expert in nuclear fuels.
Mirza Yousaf Baig, nuclear chemist, a senior scientist and the owner of a construction company.
Admiral (retired) Humayan Niaz, an electrical engineer and a retired Pakistan Navy Admiral in the electrical engineering division of Pakistan Navy.
S.M. Tufail, an industrial engineer
Commodore (retired) Arshad Chaudhry (Naval Engineer)
Mohammed Hanif (an Industrialist and a civil engineer).[1]
[edit] Activities
The stated purpose of UTN was to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure and raise money to develop the Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan. UTN reportedly had the personal support of Mullah Omar and close ties to Taliban regime. The U.S. declared Ummah Tameer-e-Nau a terrorist group after a search of the group's offices in the Afghan capital, Kabul, unearthed documents referencing plans to kidnap a U.S. diplomat and outlining basic physics related to nuclear weapons.[7] Documents also showed that there was a plan to mine Uranium inside Afghanistan.[8]
[edit] Sanctions
Consequent to the US actions Pakistan also froze the assets of this organization.[9] Bank of England also ordered a freeze on its assets.[10] It was also sanctioned by the United Nations.[11] Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Dr. Chaudhry Abdul Majeed were arrested in Pakistan in November, 2001.[12] However Pakistan refused to extradite him to the United States.[13] He was subsequently freed in February 2002.[14] Hamid Gul former chief of Inter-Services Intelligence has been placed on a global watchlist of terrorists by the U.S. government.[7]
http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=ummah_tameer_e_nau_1
Profile: Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN)Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN) was a participant or observer in the following events:
2000: Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Use Charity Front to Help Taliban and Al-Qaeda
Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. [Source: BBC]Two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists create a charity to help the Taliban. The scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, had both retired the year before after long and distinguished careers, and had both become radical Islamists. They set up a charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), purporting to conduct relief work in Afghanistan, including helping to guide the Taliban on scientific matters. A number of pro-Taliban Pakistani generals and business leaders are on the board of directors, including Hamid Gul, a former director of the ISI. But not long after setting up an office in Kabul, the two scientists meet with Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden, and discuss weapons development. During a later visit, Mahmood provides one of bin Laden’s associates with information on how to construct a nuclear weapon. [Frantz and Collins, 2007, pp. 264-265; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 310-311] The two scientists will have a more extensive meeting with bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in August 2001, and will discuss how al-Qaeda can make a radioactive weapon (see Mid-August 2001). Shortly before 9/11, the CIA will learn of this meeting (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001), and also learn that UTN offered to sell a nuclear weapon to Libya, but the CIA will take no effective action against the group (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). In late 2001, the Wall Street Journal will report that “One Pakistani military analyst said it was inconceivable that a nuclear scientist would travel to Afghanistan without getting clearance from Pakistani officials and being debriefed each time. Pakistan maintains a strict watch on many of its nuclear scientists, using a special arm of the Army’s general headquarters to monitor them even after retirement.” Furthermore, a former ISI colonel says the ISI “was always aware of UTN’s activities and had encouraged Dr. Mahmoud’s Afghanistan trips. He said the ISI learned last year that Dr. Mahmoud had recently discussed nuclear matters with Mr. bin Laden, and Dr. Mahmoud agreed not to do so again.” [Wall Street Journal, 12/24/2001] The US will finally freeze UTN’s assets in December 2001 (see Early October-December 2001).
Entity Tags: Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Osama bin Laden, Hamid Gul, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Mullah Omar, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Between Mid-August and September 10, 2001: ISI Director Learns Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Are Helping Al-Qaeda, but Fails to Take Action or Warn US
Some time before 9/11, ISI Director Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed learns that two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists met with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan in mid-August 2001. Bin Laden revealed to the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, that he had acquired nuclear material and wanted their help to turn it into a weapon (see Mid-August 2001). ISI Director Mahmood is said to have learned about this through military contacts, as several Pakistani generals sit on the board of directors of a charity run by the two scientists that assists the Taliban. For instance, Hamid Gul, a former director of the ISI, is the charity’s honorary patron and was in Afghanistan at the time of the meeting. However, the ISI does not warn the US or take any action against the scientists or their charity. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 310-311]
Entity Tags: Mahmood Ahmed, Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Hamid Gul, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Mid-August 2001: Bin Laden Meets with Pakistani Nuclear Scientists and Discusses Building Nuclear Weapon
Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. [Source: Public domain]Two retired Pakistani nuclear scientists meet with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri at a campfire in a compound near Kandahar, Afghanistan. The more prominent scientist, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, worked with A. Q. Khan for two decades before having a falling out with him in the early 1990s (however, he was seen with Khan earlier in 2001 (see April 2001)). A highly regarded scientist, he also became an advocate of the Taliban and published a pamphlet predicting that “by 2002 millions may die through mass destruction weapons… terrorist attack, and suicide.” He was forced to retire in 1999 after publicly advocating sharing nuclear technology with other Islamic countries. The other scientist, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, also retired in 1999 after a long career. In 2000, the two men set up a charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, purporting to conduct relief work in Afghanistan (see 2000). Bin Laden allegedly tells the scientists that he has made great headway in advancing the apocalypse predicted by Mahmood. He claims that he has acquired highly enriched uranium from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and wants their help to turn it into a bomb. The scientists reply that while they could help with the science of fissile materials, they are not weapons designers. They are also asked with other Pakistani weapons experts could be approached for help. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 310-311] They spend two or three days at the compound and discuss how the material could be used to create a so-called dirty bomb, in which radioactive material is blown up using conventional explosives to spread radiation. But the discussion apparently ends inconclusively when bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others depart abruptly for the mountains. Before leaving, bin Laden says that something great is going to happen soon and Muslims around the world will join them in holy war. [Frantz and Collins, 2007, pp. 264-265] Both US intelligence and Pakistani ISI learn about this meeting prior to the 9/11 attacks, but neither group will take any effective action as a result (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001 and Between Mid-August and September 10, 2001).
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Shortly Before September 11, 2001: CIA Learns Pakistani Charity Front Tried to Sell Nuclear Weapon to Libya, but Takes No Effective Action Against It
According to a 2007 book by former CIA Director George Tenet, shortly before 9/11, the CIA learns that a Pakistani charity front has been helping al-Qaeda acquire weapons of mass destruction. The charity, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), was founded in 2000 by two prominent nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed (see 2000). UTN allegedly is conducting charitable projects in Afghanistan, but a friendly intelligence service tells the CIA that UTN is really helping al-Qaeda build weapons, especially nuclear weapons. Tenet will claim that he presses “all of our contacts worldwide to find out anything we could about the people and organizations with WMD that might be wiling to share expertise with al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.” Ben Bonk, deputy chief of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), meets with Musa Kusa, head of Libya’s intelligence service, and Kusa tells him that Libya had contact with UTN. “Yes, they tried to sell us a nuclear weapon. Of course, we turned them down.” According to Tenet, this confirms other information from a different intelligence agency that UTN approached Libya with an offer to provide WMD expertise. The CIA then informs the Pakistani government of this, and Pakistan brings in seven board members of UTN for questioning. But according to Tenet, “The investigation was ill-fated from the get-go” and the UTN officials “were not properly isolated and questioned.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 262-263] Also shortly before 9/11, the CIA also learns that the two nuclear scientists who founded UTN had recently met with Osama bin Laden and advised him on how to make a nuclear weapon (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001). But despite all this the US takes no other action against UTN before 9/11, not even freezing the assets of the charity until December 2001 (see Early October-December 2001).
Entity Tags: Musa Kusa, Ben Bonk, Central Intelligence Agency, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, George J. Tenet, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Osama bin Laden
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Shortly Before September 11, 2001: CIA Learns Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Are Helping Al-Qaeda, but Takes No Effective Action
In October 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Pakistan and tells Pakistani officials that, shortly before 9/11, the CIA learned two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists had met with al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in mid-August 2001 (see Early October-December 2001). In the meeting, the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, discussed helping al-Qaeda make a nuclear weapon (see Mid-August 2001). [Frantz and Collins, 2007, pp. 268-269] In a 2007 book, former CIA Director George Tenet will confirm that the CIA learned of this prior to 9/11. He will write, “A Western intelligence service came to us in the fall of 2001 [with details of the meeting]… [The] CIA pressed the Pakistanis to confront Mahmood and Majeed with this new information. We put [evidence that a charity named Ummah Tameer-e-Nau run by Mahmood and Majeed tried to sell Libya a nuclear weapon] on the table. We also passed new information that had been collected by other intelligence services. To no avail. Then 9/11 struck, and there was no slowing down in this pursuit.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 264] But no evidence will come forward that President Bush or other top US officials were warned of this, or that there were any general warnings inside the US government about this. Pakistan is not successfully pressured about it before 9/11 (in fact, the Pakistani ISI already knew about it and failed to warn the US (see Between Mid-August and September 10, 2001)), and after 9/11 the only action Pakistan will take is to twice arrest and then quickly release the two scientists. Authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark will comment in a 2007 book that “This information, added to the missing canisters of highly enriched uranium [in Pakistan], might have been sufficient to redirect” top Bush officials to take sterner action against al-Qaeda before 9/11. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 311]
Entity Tags: Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, George J. Tenet, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Central Intelligence Agency, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
Early October-December 2001: US and Pakistan Do Little about Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Who Helped Al-Qaeda
Ummah Tameer-e-Nau’s headquarters in Kabul. [Source: CBC]In early October 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell visits Pakistan and discusses the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. He offers US technical assistance to improve the security of Pakistan’s nukes, but Pakistan rejects the offer. Powell also says that the CIA learned of a secret meeting held in mid-August 2001 between two Pakistani nuclear scientists and al-Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri (see Mid-August 2001). As a result of US pressure, Pakistan arrests the two scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, on October 23. The Pakistani ISI secretly detains them for four weeks, but concludes that they are harmless and releases them. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 264-268; Frantz and Collins, 2007, pp. 269-271] In mid-November, after the Taliban is routed from Kabul (see November 13, 2001), the CIA takes over the headquarters there of Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), a charity founded by the two scientists. In addition to charity material, they find numerous documents and pieces of equipment to help build WMD, including plans for conducting an anthrax attack. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 322] As a result, on December 1, CIA Director George Tenet, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, head of the CIA Counterterrorist Center’s WMD branch, and a CIA analyst named Kevin make an emergency trip to Pakistan to discuss the issue. Accompanied by Wendy Chamberlin, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Tenet meets with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and urges him to take stronger action against the two scientists and their UTN charity. Musharraf reluctantly agrees, and the two men are rearrested. According to a 2007 book by Tenet, after being tested by a team of US polygraph experts and questioned by US officials, “Mahmood confirmed all we had heard about the August 2001 meeting with Osama bin Laden, and even provided a hand-drawn rough bomb design that he had shared with al-Qaeda leaders.” During the meeting, an unnamed senior al-Qaeda leader showed Mahmood a cannister that may have contained some kind of nuclear material. This leader shared ideas about building a simple firing system for a nuclear “dirty bomb” using commercially available supplies. [Tenet, 2007, pp. 264-268; Frantz and Collins, 2007, pp. 269-271] However, on December 13, the two scientists are quietly released again. The US does not officially freeze UTN’s assets until December 20, and Pakistan apparently follows suit a short time later (see December 20, 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 12/24/2001; Frantz and Collins, 2007, pp. 271]
Entity Tags: Wendy Chamberlin, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Pervez Musharraf, Al-Qaeda, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Colin Powell, George J. Tenet, Osama bin Laden, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
December 2001: CIA Unable to Question Pakistani Nuclear Scientists Linked to Pro-Al-Qaeda Charity Front
A. Q. Khan (left) and Pervez Musharraf (right). [Source: CBC] (click image to enlarge)After CIA Director George Tenet visits Pakistan and pressures the Pakistani government to take stronger action against the charity front Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN) (see Early October-December 2001), the CIA learns more about the organization. The CIA was previously aware that the two prominent nuclear scientists who co-founded UTN, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, had met with Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and advised them on how to make a nuclear weapon (see Mid-August 2001). However, the CIA discovers that other nuclear scientists are also connected to UTN, including Mirza Yusef Beg, a former member of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), and Humayun Niaz, also formerly with the PAEC. At least two senior Pakistani military officers are also connected to UTN. All these men are brought in and questioned by US officials. But the CIA is unable to question two others connected to UTN, Muhammad Ali Mukhtar, a nuclear physicist who worked for the PAEC as a weapons expert, and Suleiman Asad, who worked at A. Q. Khan’s Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in its weapons design division. The CIA reasons that these two scientists would be the type of nuclear bomb makers bin Laden was most interested in. However, the Pakistani government claims that the two are in Burma working on a top secret project and cannot be brought back to Pakistan for questioning. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 320-321] Shortly after 9/11, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf called one of the leaders of Burma and asked if the two scientists could be given asylum there. [New York Times, 12/9/2001] The CIA is also interested in talking to Hamid Gul, a former ISI director and UTN’s honorary patron, but Pakistan will not allow him to be questioned either, even though he had met with Mahmood in Afghanistan around the time Mahmood met with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. As a result, the CIA is unable to learn just how much UTN could have assisted al-Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. [Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 320-321]
Entity Tags: Suleiman Asad, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, Pervez Musharraf, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Mullah Omar, Humayun Niaz, Hamid Gul, Chaudiri Abdul Majeed, Central Intelligence Agency, Muhammad Ali Mukhtar, Osama bin Laden, Kahuta Research Laboratories, Mirza Yusef Beg
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline, A. Q. Khan's Nuclear Network
December 20, 2001: US Bans Pakistani Militant Group, but It Continues Operating Under New Name
The Red Fort in Delhi, India, shortly after being attacked in 2000. [Source: BBC]The US officially blocks the assets of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), a Pakistani militant group, and Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN), a Pakistani charity front. [White House, 12/20/2001] LeT has frequently attacked targets in India with the tacit support of the Pakistani government. For instance, LeT took credit for an attack on the Red Fort in Delhi in 2000 that killed three people. [BBC, 3/17/2006] But the US fails to mention Pakistani government support for LeT, particularly long-time support by Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who is now president of Pakistan (see 1993-1994). The Pakistani government officially bans LeT one month later. But the group changes its name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa and continues operating, though less openly than before. It is said to be closely linked to al-Qaeda. The US action comes just days after LeT was implicated in an attack on the Indian parliament (see December 13, 2001). [Asia Times, 6/4/2004] India will blame the group for major attacks in 2003 and 2005 that each kill about 60 people. [BBC, 3/17/2006] UTN was founded by Pakistani nuclear scientists (see 2000). The CIA was aware before 9/11 that UTN had proposed selling a nuclear weapon to Libya (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001), and that two UTN scientists met with Osama bin Laden (see Shortly Before September 11, 2001), so it is not known why the US waited until now to act against it.
Entity Tags: Pervez Musharraf, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
December 24, 2001-January 23, 2002: Reporter Daniel Pearl Investigates Sensitive Topics in Pakistan
Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl writes stories about the ISI that will lead to his kidnapping and murder (see January 31, 2002).
On December 24, 2001, he reports about ties between the ISI and a Pakistani organization, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau, that was working on giving bin Laden nuclear secrets before 9/11 (see 2000 and Mid-August 2001). [Wall Street Journal, 12/24/2001]
A few days later, he reports that the ISI-supported militant organization Jaish-e-Mohammed still has its office running and bank accounts working, even though President Pervez Musharraf claims to have banned the group. The Jaish-i-Mohammed is connected to the Al Rashid Trust, one of the first entities whose assets were frozen by the US after 9/11 and through which funding may have passed on its way to the hijackers in the US (see Early August 2001 and September 24, 2001). “If [Pearl] hadn’t been on the ISI’s radarscope before, he was now.” [Wall Street Journal, 12/31/2001; Guardian, 7/16/2002; Vanity Fair, 8/2002]
He begins investigating links between shoe bomber Richard Reid and Pakistani militants, and comes across connections to the ISI and a mysterious religious group called Al-Fuqra. [Washington Post, 2/23/2002]
He also may be looking into the US training and backing of the ISI. [Gulf News, 3/25/2002]
He is writing another story on Dawood Ibrahim, a powerful Islamic militant and gangster protected by the ISI, and other Pakistani organized crime figures. [Newsweek, 2/4/2002; Vanity Fair, 8/2002]
Former CIA agent Robert Baer later claims to be working with Pearl on an investigation of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. [United Press International, 4/9/2004] It is later suggested that Mohammed masterminds both Reid’s shoe bomb attempt and the Pearl kidnapping, and has connections to Pakistani gangsters and the ISI, so some of these explanations could fit together. [Asia Times, 10/30/2002; CNN, 1/30/2003; United Press International, 4/9/2004] Kidnapper Saeed will later say of Pearl, “Because of his hyperactivity he caught our interest.” [News (Islamabad), 2/15/2002] Pearl is kidnapped on January 23, 2002, and his murder is confirmed on February 22, 2002. [CNN, 2/22/2002]
Entity Tags: Dawood Ibrahim, Al-Fuqra, Daniel Pearl, Pakistan Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Osama bin Laden, Pervez Musharraf, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Robert Baer, Ummah Tameer-e-Nau
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
http://revolutionizingawareness.com/2010/12/04/hybrid-newsletter-2-for-04-12-2010-a-d/
Excerpt:
Memos reveal US-Libya standoff over uranium
By LEE KEATH, Associated Press – 27 mins ago
AP – FILE – Seif al-Islam Gadhafi talks to reporters at the ancient city of Cyrene near the city of al-Bayda
CAIRO – As it dismantled its nuclear weapons program, Libya sparked a tense diplomatic standoff with the United States last year when it refused to hand over its last batch of highly enriched uranium to protest the slowness of improving ties with Washington, leaked U.S. diplomatic memos reveal.
The monthlong standoff, which has not previously been made public, was resolved only after a call from U.S. Secretary of State HillaryRodham Clinton to Libya’s foreign minister, apparently to underline Washington’s commitment to warming relations. After the call, Libya allowed Russia to take away the uranium in December 2009.
But for that month, U.S. officials issued frantic warnings that the 11.5 pounds (5.2 kilograms) of highly enriched uranium was vulnerable to start leaking or be stolen, since it was sitting at Libya’s Tajoura nuclear facility with only a single armed guard.
The incident illustrates Libya’s unpredictability as it shakes off its longtime pariah status and rebuilds ties with the U.S. and the world. The series of memos released by the WikiLeaks website to the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar, which published them this week, also shows the efforts of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli — which reopened in 2007 after a closure of nearly 30 years — to track Libya’s opaque and often confusing politics. Several memos speculate on the jockeying for succession to power among the sons of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi — Seif al-Islam, Mutassim and Khamis.
“Burgeoning sibling rivalry between Gadhafi’s progeny is near inevitable,” reads a November 2009 embassy memo. Gadhafi “has placed his sons … on a succession high wire act, perpetually thrown off-balance, in what might be a calculated effort by the aging leader to prevent any one of them from authoritatively gaining the prize.”
Gadhafi’s 2003 decision to renounce terrorism and dismantle Libya’s secret nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development program was a key step in opening the door to normalization with the U.S and the West. Since that time, the U.S., Russia and other countries have been transporting centrifuges, uranium and other nuclear equipment out of Libya. The U.S. and the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, have declared Libya’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs fully dismantled.
The standoff was a last-minute surprise.
On Nov. 23, 2009, a Russian cargo plane landed at Tripoli, expecting to take the last of Libya’s highly enriched uranium, contained in seven containers known as casks. Then the Libyans informed the Russians and Americans that the material would not be handed over — and the plane left without the cargo, according to a Nov. 25 memo from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli.
The embassy raised the alarm, warning that Tajoura was “lightly guarded” and that U.S. experts had seen “only one security guard with a gun” there. It said it asked the Libyans to beef up security and remove a loading crane at the site “to prevent an intruder from using it to remove the casks.” It also warned that within three months, the casks would start to leak and release radioactive material.
Two days later, Seif al-Islam Gadhafi — seen as a the main reform proponent in Libya — told the ambassador that the shipment was halted because Libya was “fed up” with the slow pace of relations between Tripoli and Washington, another memo reported.
Specifically, he said Libya wanted deals to purchase military equipment and other “compensation” for its dismantled facilities.
More broadly, he said the U.S.-Libyan relationship was “not going well” and pointed to slights against his father during his visit to New York the previous September for the U.N. General Assembly — including protests in several suburbs against Gadhafi’s attempts to pitch a ceremonial Bedouin-style tent to stay in, and the refusal to allow Gadhafi to visit Ground Zero.
In the memo, the embassy recommended that Clinton contact Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa with a “general statement of commitment to work with the Libyans to move the relationship forward,” coupled with a “strong” demand that the uranium be released and “not be held hostage.”
On Dec. 3, Clinton called Kusa with “the statement of commitment,” a later memo said, without specifying the content of the message. Soon after, the embassy reported that the Libyans promised the uranium would be released.
On Dec. 20, the Russian cargo plane returned, the uranium was loaded and taken to Russia the next day.
“Today’s flight marked the successful completion of Libya’s commitments to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs,” the embassy reported.
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/category/topic/libya
Excerpt:
Interactions between State Department officials and the Libyan government continue. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns spoke twice over the last two days with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman has spoken with Kusa several times, the State Department said.
Spokesman P.J. Crowley said on Thursday that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to call Kusa earlier this week, but that the call could not be completed due to technical reasons. No attempts have been made to talk with Qaddafi directly, he said, but the State Department has passed him messages through unidentified third parties.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Alsos
Operation Alsos wikipedia
Excerpt:
Operation Alsos (or Alsos Mission) was an effort at the end of World War II by the Allies (principally Britain and the United States), branched off from the Manhattan Project, to investigate the German nuclear energy project, seize German nuclear resources, materials and personnel to further American research and to prevent their capture by the Soviets, and to discern how far the Germans had gone towards creating an atomic bomb. The personnel of the project followed close behind the front lines, first into Italy, and then into France and Germany, searching for personnel, records, material, and sites involved.
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/category/topic/libya
Excerpt:
Interactions between State Department officials and the Libyan government continue. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Bill Burns spoke twice over the last two days with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman has spoken with Kusa several times, the State Department said.
Spokesman P.J. Crowley said on Thursday that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to call Kusa earlier this week, but that the call could not be completed due to technical reasons. No attempts have been made to talk with Qaddafi directly, he said, but the State Department has passed him messages through unidentified third parties.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Alsos
Operation Alsos wikipedia
Excerpt:
Operation Alsos (or Alsos Mission) was an effort at the end of World War II by the Allies (principally Britain and the United States), branched off from the Manhattan Project, to investigate the German nuclear energy project, seize German nuclear resources, materials and personnel to further American research and to prevent their capture by the Soviets, and to discern how far the Germans had gone towards creating an atomic bomb. The personnel of the project followed close behind the front lines, first into Italy, and then into France and Germany, searching for personnel, records, material, and sites involved.
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